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LAW AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 
In the modern period, the most original and influen-
tial theories about law and politics were developed 
in connection with a set of far-reaching, interrelated 
questions about the definition of law, the purpose of 
law, the relationship between law and morality, and 
the existence of natural law and natural rights. 
Montesquieu 
Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brede et de 
Montesquieu (1689-1755), published The Spirit of 
the Laws in 1748. In this widely read and highly 
influential work (it appeared in 22 editions within 
18 months after its first publication), Montesquieu 
defines laws as "the necessary relations deriving 
from the nature of things." Laws are both the rela-
tions that exist between God and created beings and 
the relations of these created beings to one another. 
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For Montesquieu, it is possible to discern a unifor-
mity in the relations between things, despite their 
wide diversity. Thus, although one body is capa-
ble of moving another body in various ways, such 
motion will always be in accordance with the rela-
tions of mass and velocity. A similar kind of unifor-
mity in the midst of diversity can be found in human 
affairs. Even before humans make their own positive 
laws, there exist "possible relations of justice" that 
determine which actual relations between humans 
are just and which are unjust. For Montesquieu, 
there are thus laws of nature or natural laws that 
are grounded in the very nature of things and that 
underlie true "relations of fairness" as they exist 
apart from any positive or human-made laws, and 
apart from the will of any sovereign. 
Although affirming the existence of natural 
law, Montesquieu differs from previous thinkers 
who held that one or another form of government 
was the "most natural" for human beings. For 
Montesquieu, what is "most natural" is not that 
which is "most common" or "most basic" but what 
is most in accord with a thing's nature or its internal 
principle of activity. Just as individual things have 
their own natures, so too a people or a nation can 
be said to have a nature or "character" or "general 
spirit" of its own. The general spirit of a people 
emerges in connection with a wide variety of partic-
ular conditions pertaining to that people, including 
their climatic and geographical situation, their way 
of life, their degree of liberty, their religion, their 
level of wealth, the size of their population, their 
modes of commerce, and their mores and man-
ners. When contemplating acts of legislation, says 
Montesquieu, legislators should not be guided by 
abstract, rationalistic ideas about justice but by the 
general spirit of the people for whom the legislation 
is intended. Law is most effective, after all, when it 
is least coercive and most suited to a people's "natu-
ral genius." Furthermore, legislators should not try 
to correct all the mores and manners of a people 
but only those that are manifestly unjust or harm-
ful. Even when some mores and manners stand in 
need of correction, it is best if political leaders aim 
to correct them, not by relying on the coercive force 
of the law but by appealing to other mores and 
manners already recognized by the people. 
One of Montesquieu's best-known contribu-
tions to legal and political theory is his argument 
for a "separation of powers" within the state. 
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Montesquieu identifies three possible kinds of 
powers within the state: the legislative power, the 
executive power over the things depending on the 
right of nations (or simply "the executive power"), 
and the executive power over the things depend-
ing on civil right (or simply "the judicial power"). 
If political liberty is to be preserved, Montesquieu 
argues, then these three powers must be vested in 
different individuals or different bodies, each act-
ing independently of the other two. If individuals 
are to have political liberty, says Montesquieu, then 
the government and laws must be arranged so that 
no citizen stands in fear of any other citizen. Such 
becomes impossible, however, when two or more of 
the state's powers are vested in a single individual or 
in a single body. 
Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws was praised by 
radical progressives such as Voltaire (who appreciated 
Montesquieu's observations about religious diversity 
and tolerance) but also by traditionalist conservatives 
such as Edmund Burke (who shared Montesquieu's 
skepticism about affecting social change through 
coercive legal means). The influence of Montesquieu's 
thought regarding the separation of powers is readily 
discernible in the Instruction of Catherine the Great 
of Russia, in the Federalist Papers (especially nos. 47 
through 51), in the American Constitution, and in 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. 
William Blackstone 
The work of William Blackstone (1723-80) is 
important not so much for its originality as a piece 
of legal theory as for its originality as a work of 
systematization. Blackstone's four-volume work, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, was first 
published in England between 1765 and 1769 and 
then in the United States between 1771 and 1772. 
The Commentaries gave systematic form to a vast 
range of previously disconnected legal questions, 
showing how almost every aspect of English law 
could be analyzed and explained through the basic 
principles of a "rational science" of law. This "ratio-
nal science" was divided into four parts, focusing 
on "the rights of persons" (Book I); "the rights 
of things," by which Blackstone meant the rights 
that people can have in things (Book II); "private 
wrongs," including torts (Book III); and "public 
wrongs," including crimes against other citizens, 
against God, and against religion (Book IV). 
Blackstone defines law as "a rule of action dic-
tated by some superior being." As applied to human 
action, laws are the precepts by which humans are 
commanded how to regulate their behavior. For 
Blackstone, human beings are obliged to obey the 
laws given to them by God, for an inferior being 
is inevitably obliged to follow the rules of conduct 
given to it by the superior being on which it depends. 
But human beings are not only obliged to obey the 
will of God, they are naturally inclined to do so as 
well. This is because God, in His infinite wisdom 
and goodness, constituted human beings so that 
they would need no inducement to follow the law 
of nature other than their own self-love, which is the 
"universal principle" of human action. According 
to Blackstone, the rule of obedience for all human 
action can be reduced to one precept, which con-
stitutes the foundation of all ethics or natural law: 
"[M]an should pursue his own true and substantial 
happiness" (1765, Vol. I, 41). 
For Blackstone, the precepts of the natural law are 
universally binding on all human beings, regardless 
of time or place. All positive, or human-made, laws 
derive their force and authority from the natural law; 
human laws that are contrary to the natural law can 
have no validity. If humans were always clear and 
unprejudiced in their reasoning, they could know 
how to act by relying on their natural reason and 
their natural inclinations alone. But since humans 
are prone to ignorance and error, they need the fur-
ther guidance of revealed or divine law, which God 
has provided through the scriptures. But the natural 
law and the divine law, on their own, are insufficient 
for guiding human conduct. This is because humans 
are neither self-sufficient nor courageous enough to 
live entirely on their own; they need to live in soci-
ety with one another. Since it is impossible for all 
human beings to be united within a single, compre-
hensive society, they end up forming a multiplicity of 
separate, but interacting, states. Accordingly, there 
arises not only the need for municipal law or civil 
law (which governs the relations prevailing within a 
single state), but also the need for a "law of nations" 
or jus gentium (which governs the relations of differ-
ent states to one another). 
Municipal or civil law, says Blackstone, is a rule 
of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power 
within a state. For Blackstone, the primary aim of 
human society and thus of municipal law is to pro-
tect individuals in their enjoyment of the "absolute 
rights" they possess simply in virtue of the immu-
table laws of nature. These absolute rights include 
the rights to personal security, to personal liberty, 
and to personal property. No human legislature has 
the power to abridge or destroy these rights, says 
Blackstone, unless their possessor has committed an 
act that amounts to a forfeiture of such rights. A sec-
ondary aim of human society and thus of municipal 
law is to protect individuals in their enjoyment of 
"social" or "relative" rights (e.g., the right to trial 
by jury), which result from and are posterior to the 
formation of states and societies. 
The municipal law of England can be subdivided 
into two kinds: "the unwritten common law" and 
"the written or statute law." Because written law 
is expressed in general and not particular terms, 
it follows that no written law can fully anticipate 
the concrete circumstances under which it might be 
applied. Thus, the determination of what a written 
law actually commands in some particular circum-
stance will require some recourse to the rationale 
or justification behind the law. Since only intelligent 
beings can discern when and how the law's rationale 
might apply, "it is necessary that when the general 
decrees of the law come to be applied to particular 
cases, there should be somewhere a power vested of 
defining those circumstances" for applying the law 
(1765, Vol. I, 62). Thus, there arises the need for 
judges, who are authorized to decide cases in light of 
"equity" by taking into consideration the particular 
circumstances surrounding individual cases. If the 
rationale or justification behind a written law ceases 
to apply, says Blackstone, then "the law also ceases 
with it" (Commentaries, 1767, Vol. III, 219; 1765, 
Vol. I, 61). For Blackstone, the unwritten "common 
law," as embodied in the understandings, practices, 
and customs of judges, can never be supplanted 
by a system of written law or "statute law." When 
deciding cases in light of equity, Blackstone goes 
on to argue, judges generally should follow past 
precedents; however, judges may disregard previ-
ous decisions when they are manifestly absurd or 
unjust. This is not because such previous decisions 
are instances of bad law; rather, it is because-being 
contrary to reason or justice-they are not law at all. 
Blackstone's Commentaries were exceedingly 
influential at the time of the American founding, and 
they were regularly cited by those in favor of ratify-
ing the American Constitution (e.g., by Alexander 
Hamilton, in Federalist nos. 69 and 84) as well as 
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by those opposed to ratification (e.g., by Patrick 
Henry, who argued, in reliance on Blackstone, that 
the Constitution should provide for jury trials in 
civil cases). Blackstone's Commentaries remained a 
staple of Anglophone legal education for the next 
150 years. 
Jeremy Bentham 
In 1763, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) attended 
the Oxford University lectures given by Blackstone 
that were later to become part of the latter's 
Commentaries on the Laws of England. But unlike 
Blackstone, who sought to explain and justify 
English law, Bentham was interested primarily in 
critique and reform. And unlike both Montesquieu 
and Blackstone, whose main contributions to 
legal thought can be found in individual works, 
Bentham disseminated his key ideas about law 
and politics through a vast collection of disparate 
writings, including A Fragment on Government 
(1776), A Defence of Usury (1787), Introduction 
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), 
An Essay on Political Tactics (1791), Panopticon, 
or the Inspection House (1787), Emancipate Your 
Colonies (1793), Catechism of Parliamentary 
Reform (1809), Punishments and Rewards 
(1811), A Table of the Springs of Action (1815), 
Chrestomathia (1816), Church of Englandism and 
Its Catechism Examined (1818), Radicalism is Not 
Dangerous (1819-20), and A Treatise on Judicial 
Evidence (1825). A summary of Bentham's criti-
cisms of Blackstone can be found in his Fragment 
on Government, which is a shortened version 
of a more extensive critique, Comments on the 
Commentaries, published posthumously in 1928. 
What we call law, says Bentham, is not grounded 
in the nature of things or in the divine ideas of an 
all-benevolent God; it is grounded instead in the will 
of a sovereign (whether this be an individual or a 
group) that has the power to command its subjects 
to act in certain ways, and to induce obedience in 
its subjects by means of punishments and rewards. 
For Bentham, the purpose of human law cannot be 
to protect any "natural" order of justice or "natu-
ral" rights as they allegedly exist apart from positive 
laws and apart from the will of a sovereign. This is 
because there are no such things as "natural" rights 
or "natural" justice in the first place. According to 
Bentham, a "right" is nothing other than an actual 
r 
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"security" enjoyed by someone under the protec-
tion of some more powerful person or body (such 
as the sovereign). It follows from this that there is no 
such thing as a right that is not an enforceable right; 
and no such thing as justice that is not enforceable 
justice. For Bentham, then, the positive law does 
not protect preexisting rights or enforce preexisting 
duties that persons allegedly have in a state of nature 
or as a matter of natural right; on the contrary, it 
is the positive law that brings into existence all the 
rights and duties that persons have in the first place. 
The ideas of law, offense, right, and obligation, says 
Bentham, "are born together" and are inseparably 
connected. 
According to Bentham, proponents of "natural 
law" jurisprudence (including Blackstone) system-
atically failed to distinguish between "expositorial" 
(or merely descriptive) jurisprudence and "censo-
rial" (or evaluative) jurisprudence. As a result, they 
also failed to distinguish between the law as it is and 
the law as it should be. On account of these confu-
sions, "natural law" thinkers were led to the errone-
ous view that law, in order to exist at all, must be 
in accord with reason and justice and, conversely, 
that supposedly "bad" laws-being contrary to 
reason and justice--could not really exist as laws at 
all. Against such "natural law" reasoning, Bentham 
argued that it is obvious that "bad" laws can exist. 
For a law, after all, is nothing other than the com-
mand of a sovereign backed by the threat of force. It 
is obvious that a command can be issued, and those 
subject to it can be induced to obey, even if there is 
nothing "reasonable" or "just" about the command 
being issued. By arguing that the existence of law 
is one thing and its moral merit is another (or that 
there is "no necessary connection" between law and 
morality), Bentham laid the theoretical groundwork 
for what has since come to be known as modern 
"legal positivism." 
Bentham opposed "natural law" reasoning, not 
only because he regarded it as deeply confused as 
a matter of theory, but he also believed that it sup-
ported perniciously antireformist consequences in 
the realm of practice. If bad law is no law at all, as 
the "natural law" theorists held, then it becomes dif-
ficult to see how actual existing laws could be "bad" 
and thus in need of reform. For Bentham, it is only 
by acknowledging that "bad" laws can exist that 
we will be in a position to begin reforming them. 
Furthermore, the question of how bad laws should 
be reformed is not to be settled by reference to an 
empty, abstract, speculative account of "natural 
law"; instead, it is to be settled by reference to a read-
ily accessible and easily understandable standard 
of right and wrong, namely, the principle of utility. 
According to this principle, an action is right to the 
extent that it tends to produce pleasure or happi-
ness and wrong to the extent that it tends to produce 
pain or unhappiness. For Bentham, the actions of all 
individual and all legal regimes are to be measured 
and judged in accordance with the principle of util-
ity or "the greatest happiness principle." The guid-
ing purpose of the law should be nothing other than 
to promote social welfare or utility or "the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number." 
Bentham's commitment to the principle of utility 
led him to hold that legal punishments could be jus-
tified only on the grounds that they incentivize good 
behavior and deter bad behavior in those who are 
subject to the law. As a result, he argued that legal 
punishment was not for the sake of retribution, and 
he sought to reform many of England's often-cruel 
penal practices that had been based on retributiv-
ist ideas about punishment. Bentham's belief in the 
principle of utility also led him to argue in favor of 
replacing the unwritten "common law" of England 
with a fully written, codified system of statutory 
law. Because the "common law" was unwritten and 
depended so heavily on the unpredictable, discre-
tionary rulings of judges, it failed to provide legal 
subjects with sufficient advance guidance about how 
they should conduct themselves; and when the law 
fails in this way, he noted, it cannot properly serve 
to incentivize good behavior and deter bad behav-
ior. Bentham famously derided England's regime of 
unwritten, judge-made "common law" as a regime 
of arbitrary, ex post facto law-making that was 
more suited to dogs than to human beings: 
When your dog does anything you want to break 
him of, you wait till he does it, and then you beat 
him for it. This is the way you make laws for your 
dog: and this is the way the judges make law for you 
and me. They won't tell a man beforehand what it is 
he should not do (1843, 235). 
A lover of neologisms (he invented the now-
common words, "codification," "minimize," "maxi-
mize," and "international"), Bentham made a num-
ber of innovative proposals for concrete legal and 
social reform, including what he called a Pannomion 
(a complete and systematic code of laws that would 
leave no room for unreliable guesswork by citizens or 
arbitrary discretion by judges) and a Panopticon 
(a building whose design included a central observa-
tion tower allowing authorities at prisons, asylums, 
schools, and workhouses to see all of their charges all 
at once, without in turn being seen). In 1794, the 
English Parliament agreed to fund Bentham's 
Panopticon plan for a new prison, to be managed by 
Bentham himself (foundations for the prison were 
laid, but in 1804, the project was terminated on 
account of insufficient funding). Bentham's thought 
exerted a substantial influence over the later utili-
tarian and social reformist philosophies of James 
Mill (1773-1836), John Stuart Mill (1806-73), 
Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), and Alexander Bain 
(1818-1903). Bentham's positivistic jurisprudence 
helped to inspire the later legal positivism of John 
Austin (1790-1859), Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
(1841-1935), Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), H. L. A. 
Hart (1907-92), and Joseph Raz (1939-). Bentham's 
utilitarian jurisprudence is the distant precursor to 
the "law and economics" school of contemporary 
legal theory, championed in its early days by Ronald 
Coase (1910-), Guido Calabresi (1932-), and 
Richard Posner ( 19 3 9-). 
Immanuel Kant 
For Immanuel Kant ( 1724-1804 ), theorizing about 
the law cannot be based simply on our experien-
tially derived judgments about human desires or 
needs since our merely empirical judgments can 
never yield the necessity and universality that are the 
true hallmarks of a genuine science of right. Instead, 
jurisprudence must take its bearings from the non-
empirical or a priori concept of "right" (Recht) 
as such. According to its pure or a priori concept, 
"right" is the sum of the conditions under which 
the free choice of one person can be united with the 
free choice of others in accordance with a universal 
law. The "universal law of right" stipulates that per-
sons may rightfully perform external actions only 
to the extent that the exercise of their free choice 
through such actions can coexist with the free choice 
of everyone else in accordance with a universal law. 
For Kant, the concept of right is necessarily con-
nected with the authorization to use force or coer-
cion (e.g., through the use of law). For a person acts 
wrongly when he or she hinders the free choice of 
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someone else. Such a hindrance amounts to an act 
of coercion by the wrong-doer; for when the wrong-
doer hinders the freedom of another, the wrongdoer 
forces the wronged party to do or refrain from doing 
something entirely apart from the wronged party's 
own act of choosing. Now if one person's use of 
freedom amounts to an act of hindering the freedom 
of another, then the use of coercion to prevent such a 
hindrance (the hindering of a hindrance to freedom 
or the coercive prevention of coercion) is justified. 
Prior to Kant's time, it was common to think that 
the coercion of free persons by means of the law 
was justifiable on the grounds that freedom must 
be limited or compromised at times for the sake of 
achieving goods that are external to freedom itself. 
These goods might include the cultivation of indi-
vidual virtue or the promotion of social welfare. 
Kant, however, rejects such an approach. For Kant, 
it is always wrong to coerce free persons for the sake 
of promoting goods that are external to freedom 
itself; for it is always wrong to use a person as a 
mere means to some end, even if the end for which 
the person is being used is an exceedingly important 
one. Significantly, Kant observes that what is right 
or justified does not pertain to relations between 
persons and external objects; it pertains instead 
to relations among persons. Although one person 
may never rightfully be used as a mere means for 
another person's ends, there is nothing about exter-
nal objects as such that makes it wrong for persons 
to use them as mere means in the service of the ends 
that they freely set for themselves. Furthermore, free 
persons must be permitted to make use of external 
objects even when the objects being used are not in 
the spatial vicinity, or under the physical control, 
of the persons making use of them. Just as there is 
nothing about external objects as such that makes 
it wrong for persons to use them as means in the 
service of the ends that they freely set for themselves, 
so too there is nothing about the merely contingent 
empirical conditions of such objects (e.g., the merely 
contingent fact that the object exists in a certain 
spatial location or beyond the scope of a person's 
physical control over it) that can legitimately pro-
hibit them from being used by persons in the service 
of their ends. 
For Kant, in other words, it is necessary that per-
sons be permitted to make use of external objects, 
not only through their empirical possession of such 
objects, but also through what Kant calls their 
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intelligible or noumenal possession of them. To 
have intelligible possession of an external object, 
says Kant, is to have possession of it even when 
the person who possesses the object is not spatially 
adjacent to or physically in control of the object 
being possessed. Significantly, Kant argues that such 
intelligible possession of objects cannot be secured 
in a state of nature. For in a state of nature, says 
Kant, there is no generally accepted public author-
ity for determining how the intelligible possession 
of external objects is to be acquired, enforced, and 
arbitrated in cases of disagreement. As a result, a 
person's ability to make use of an external object in a 
state of nature is forever insecure, dependent always 
on merely contingent empirical conditions, such as 
whether the person is strong, smart, or lucky enough 
to keep the external object from being appropriated 
and used by others. But this is just to say that in 
a state of nature, all possession is something other 
than rightful possession. 
For Kant, persons are obliged to exit the state 
of nature and enter into a civil condition, or a 
"condition of right" under the rule of law. They 
are obliged to do so, not because doing so will help 
them to secure ends that are external to freedom 
itself (e.g., the ends of cultivating individual virtue 
or promoting of social welfare). Instead, argues 
Kant, free persons are obliged to live in a civil 
condition (and, incidentally, obliged not to destroy 
this civil condition by means of revolution) since 
it is only in a civil condition that they can fulfill 
their vocation as free persons; for it is only in a 
civil condition that they can rightfully make use 
of external objects in pursuing the ends that they 
freely set for themselves. For Kant, the aim of the 
law is to make possible the conditions of free per-
sonhood as such, and not to promote ends that are 
external to free personhood. Kant's theory of law 
thus stands opposed to all "welfarist" or "utilitar-
ian" conceptions of the law. Kant's jurisprudential 
thought, with its emphasis on the importance of 
free personhood (and the relative unimportance of 
promoting individual virtue or social welfare), has 
influenced several twentieth-century jurispruden-
tial thinkers. The most famous of these thinkers, 
including some who depart in one way or another 
from Kant's strict a priori, anti-welfarist theory of 
right, are John Rawls (1921-2002), Robert Nozick 
(1938-2002), Ronald Dworkin (1931-), and T. M. 
Scanlon (1940-). 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny ( 1779-1861) was an 
early admirer of Kant, but inspired by post-Kantian 
Romanticism, he ended up rejecting what he regarded 
as the overly rationalistic, unhistorical character of 
Kantian jurisprudence. As a leading proponent of 
the German "historical school" of jurisprudence, 
Savigny went on to argue that the nature and origins 
of "right" should be understood not by reference to 
any nonempirical or a priori concept but by refer-
ence to the historically situated, empirically accessi-
ble Volksgeist, or "spirit of a people." Another early 
follower of Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
( 1770-1831 ), sought to develop a theory of law that 
would correct both the overly rationalistic character 
of Kantian jurisprudence as well as the overly empir-
icist character of Savigny's "historical" approach. 
According to Hegel, Kant erred by failing to real-
ize that the abstract, free personhood with which 
he began his "science of right" was not the pure, 
unhistorical personhood that he took it to be but 
instead only the result of a long, historical process of 
self-transformation through labor and social interac-
tion. If Kant had understood the underlying logic of 
human self-transformation through labor and social 
interaction, he would not have been so firmly com-
mitted to the false and dualistic belief that the law's 
purpose can be only to make possible the condi-
tions of free personhood, and not to promote social 
welfare. Karl Marx (1818-83) famously developed 
Hegel's thought to argue that the dynamics of labor 
and social interaction not only make possible free 
personhood and legality as they exist but also will 
bring about social revolution and emancipation in 
the future. Until that occurs, says Marx, law will 
continue to serve as an ideological instrument for 
the oppression of one economic class by another. In 
the twentieth century and beyond, Marx's ideologi-
cal-critical assessment of the law has been adopted 
and transformed by many different legal theorists 
(e.g., proponents of critical legal studies, critical race 
theory, and feminist legal theory) who have argued 
that the law can serve in various ways as an ideolog-
ical instrument for oppressing persons on the basis 
of class, race, and gender. 
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LEFORT' CLAUDE 
Claude Lefort (1924-2010) played a major role 
in the revival of French political philosophy in the 
1970s and 1980s. As a youth in Paris during World 
War II, Lefort studied with the philosopher Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, whose phenomenological approach 
deeply influenced Lefort's political thought. In 
the early 1940s, Lefort was briefly involved with 
Trotskyist groups, but he quickly grew critical. With 
Cornelius Castoriadis, Lefort initiated a break from 
Trotskyism that led to the founding of the group 
and journal Socialisme ou Barbarie in 1948. As a 
member of this ultra-left libertarian group, Lefort 
opposed not only the Soviet Union and the French 
Communist Party but also fellow travelers like 
Jean-Paul Sartre. After years of fraught relations 
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with Castoriadis, Lefort left Socialisme ou Barbarie 
in the early 1960s over disagreements about the 
nature and role of militant politics. Parallel to his 
political engagements, Lefort pursued a university 
career, teaching at several universities until his elec-
tion to the prestigious Ecole des Hautes Etudes en 
Sciences Sociales in 1976. In 1971, he completed a 
massive dissertation on Niccolo Machiavelli under 
the supervision of Raymond Aron. His preferred 
writing form is the essay, and many of his important 
texts are translated into three volumes, The Political 
Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, 
Totalitarianism; Democracy and Political Theory; 
and Writing: The Political Test. 
A long-term critic of totalitarian regimes, Lefort 
gained prominence as a theorist of liberal democ-
racy in the 1970s when many French intellectuals 
grew disillusioned with communism and Marxism 
more generally. Lefort's mature thought centers on 
three major claims. First, the proper goal of political 
philosophy is not to understand "politics" as a par-
ticular sector of social life but to explore the "politi-
cal," which he defines as the basic framework that 
operates as the formative or generative principle of 
the social experience itself. Second, this framework 
is a symbolic construct: In contrast to Marxists, who 
would argue that power rests on a base of material 
relations, Lefort maintains that power functions only 
through representation. Third, and again in contrast 
to Marxism, division and conflict are ineradicable 
dimensions of social experience. 
Lefort's work is best seen not as an attempt to 
provide liberal democracy with new or renewed nor-
mative foundations but as an effort to identify the 
formative principles of democratic pluralism. This 
search leads him back to a basic position advanced 
by Alexis de Tocqueville: What is most important 
about democracy is not what it does, but what it 
causes to be done, namely, its power to arouse con-
stant agitation in people. Democracy's core lies not 
in a particular set of institutions acting in a certain 
way but in the open, indeterminate, and unmaster-
able process that democracy generates. Lefort traces 
this power of democracy to a "symbolic mutation" 
in the order of power. Earlier forms of society sought 
to conceal or overcome conflict through symbolic 
representations of power as a unity; so, for example, 
the early modern monarch symbolically incarnated 
the body politic in the unity of his or her body. In the 
struggle against monarchy climaxing in the French 
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Revolution, power underwent a radical disincorpo-
ration in the name of egalitarian social relations. In 
Lefort's famous formulation, the symbolic center of 
modern democratic power is a lieu vide, an empty 
place. Democratic power may be contested, and 
specific people exercise power. However, no one 
can permanently appropriate or incarnate demo-
cratic power, nor can such power be definitively 
represented. Democracy is, therefore, not a regime 
governed by fixed laws or an unquestioned legiti-
mate power. Rather, it is a regime based on the legiti-
macy of a debate as to what is legitimate; and this 
debate is without any final guarantor or terminus. 
Totalitarianism is, in Lefort's view, the modern coun-
terpart of democracy because regimes like Nazism or 
Stalinism tried once again to conceal social division 
by reinvesting power in the symbol of the Nation, 
Party, Race, or Leader. Liberal democracy, by con-
trast, is an original form of society in which social 
division is the essence of its political logic. Once the 
markers of certainty that situated people in relation 
to each other have been lost, the conflict of opinion 
and the debate over rights become interminable. 
Basing his thought on the collapse of transcendent 
sources of political legitimacy, Lefort created an origi-
nal and highly influential theory of democracy, which 
illuminates the nature of sovereignty, the role of 
symbolic representation in politics, and the dynamic 
expansion of civil and human rights in the modern 
democratic era. 
Warren Breckman 
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LEGITIMACY 
In the political context, legitimacy amounts to the 
governed recognizing the right of the governors to 
lead and, to a certain extent, their entitlement to 
the perks of power. It is a process through which 
both political power and obedience are justified. 
Yet, it is not as if the recognition of the right to gov-
ern is without constraints on those who govern. 
Conditions have to be met for the acknowledgment 
and justification of the right to govern-that is, for 
legitimacy-to develop. Three come to mind: First, 
those in power must deliver services to the governed. 
These services may vary from one society to another, 
from one period to another, but they are require-
ments that cannot be overlooked. Second, the ser-
vices provided have to respond to and reasonably 
satisfy the key needs (of which security is an essen-
tial one) of the governed. These needs are themselves 
associated with the sense of the possible and the val-
ues (and the expectations they create) that are con-
stitutive of the identity of society. As such, they are 
crystallized in the rights of people. Third, the needs/ 
rights benchmark the responsibility and account-
ability of those in the position of command as well 
as of that of the political institutions, including the 
procedures of exercise of power and of how they 
oversee the general arrangements of society. 
The emergence of democratic values in the sec-
ond half of the eighteenth century and their increas-
ing importance ever since have emphasized these 
elements as central aspects of modern political legiti-
macy. Today the perception of political legitimacy 
comes down to the distribution of power being seen 
as expressing, defending, and promoting justice, 
understood as the fair allocation of, and access to, 
resources and opportunities (political, but also legal, 
economic, cultural, and others) resulting from rele-
vant actors, with the attribution of rights and duties 
that comes with it. In this perspective, when political 
leaders and institutions, and the social system they 
underwrite, are viewed as unjust, and consequently 
illegitimate, it is not surprising that challenging 
social injustice and the political order becomes one 
and the same thing. 
Authority being defined as legitimate power, and 
thus distinct from naked coercion, two contrasting 
dynamics of authority can be identified throughout 
history. First, when the legitimacy of leaders and 
